

Markscheme

November 2025

Philosophy

Higher level and standard level

Paper 2

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How to use the Diploma Programme Philosophy markscheme

The assessment markbands constitute the formal tool for marking examination scripts, and in these assessment markbands examiners can see the skills being assessed in the examinations. The markschemes are designed to assist examiners in possible routes taken by students in terms of the content of their answers when demonstrating their skills of doing philosophy through their responses. The points listed are not compulsory points, and not necessarily the best possible points. They are a framework to help examiners contextualize the requirements of the question, and to facilitate the application of marks according to the assessment markbands listed on page 6 for part A responses, and page 7 for part B responses.

It is important that examiners understand that the main idea of the course is to promote *doing* philosophy, and this involves activity and engagement throughout a two-year programme, as opposed to emphasizing the chance to display knowledge in a terminal set of examination papers. Even in the examinations, responses should not be assessed on how much students *know* as much as how they are able to use their knowledge in support of an argument, using the skills referred to in the various assessment markbands published in the subject guide, reflecting an engagement with philosophical activity throughout the course. As a tool intended to help examiners in assessing responses, the following points should be kept in mind when using a markscheme:

- The Diploma Programme Philosophy course is designed to encourage the skills of *doing* philosophy in the students. These skills can be accessed through reading the assessment markbands in the subject guide
- The markscheme does not intend to outline a model/correct answer
- The markscheme has an introductory paragraph which contextualizes the emphasis of the question being asked
- The bullet points below the paragraph are suggested possible points of development that should not be considered a prescriptive list but rather an indicative list where they might appear in the answer
- If there are names of philosophers and references to their work incorporated into the markscheme, this should help to give context for the examiners and does not reflect a requirement that such philosophers and references should appear in an answer: They are possible lines of development.
- Students can legitimately select from a wide range of ideas, arguments and concepts in service of the question they are answering, and it is possible that students will use material effectively that is *not* mentioned in the markscheme
- Examiners should be aware of the command terms for Philosophy as published in the Philosophy subject guide when assessing responses
- In markschemes for Paper 2 there is a greater requirement for specific content as the Paper requires the study of a text by the students and the questions set will derive from that text. The markscheme will show what is relevant for both part A and part B answers. In part B responses, students may select other material they deem as relevant
- Responses for part A and part B should be assessed using the distinct assessment markbands.

Note to examiners

Students at both Higher Level and Standard Level answer **one** question on the prescribed texts. Each question consists of two parts, and students must answer both parts of the question (a and b).

Paper 2 part A markbands

This task requires students to answer a two-part question on the prescribed text that they have studied in-depth in class. Students are presented with a choice of two questions per text and must answer both part A and part B of their selected question. For this task, students are permitted to have access to a clean/non-annotated copy of the prescribed text throughout the examination. It is expected that students will make explicit references to this text in their responses.

Part A question requires students to explain a specified concept, issue or argument from the prescribed text. It is expected that students will include explicit references to the text to support their explanation.

Marks	Level descriptor
0	The work does not reach a standard described by the descriptors below.
1–2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Little understanding of the specified concept/issue/argument from the text is demonstrated. Philosophical vocabulary is not used, or is consistently used inappropriately. • The explanation of the specified concept/issue/argument from the text is minimal. Points made are superficial and frequently unclear. There are few, if any, references to the text.
3–4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A basic understanding of the specified concept/issue/argument from the text is demonstrated. Philosophical vocabulary is used, but often inappropriately. • The explanation of the specified concept/issue/argument from the text is basic and underdeveloped. Points are often imprecise or vague, and it is often unclear what the response is trying to convey. There are occasional references to the text.
5–6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some understanding of the specified concept/issue/argument from the text is demonstrated. Philosophical vocabulary is used, sometimes appropriately. • There is a satisfactory explanation of the specified concept/issue/argument from the text, although the explanation lacks clarity and development in places. Relevant points are made but lack accuracy and detail. Specific references to the text are made, although these are sometimes ineffective.
7–8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Good understanding of the specified concept/issue/argument from the text is demonstrated. Philosophical vocabulary is used, mostly appropriately. • The explanation of the specified concept/issue/argument from the text is clear, but is in need of further development. Points made are relevant and accurate but lack detail. There are specific references to the text.
9–10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very good understanding of the specified concept/issue/argument from the text is demonstrated. There is accurate and precise use of philosophical vocabulary. • The explanation of the specified concept/issue/argument from the text is clear and well developed. Points are relevant, accurate and detailed. There are specific and effective references to the text.

Paper 2 part B markbands

Part B requires students to undertake a critical discussion of a specified concept, issue or argument from the prescribed text. As part A and part B of each question are based on the same specified concept, issue or argument from the prescribed text, students are not required to repeat explanatory material from their part A response.

Marks	Level descriptor
0	The work does not reach a standard described by the descriptors below.
1–3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Little understanding of and critical engagement with the specified concept/issue/argument from the prescribed text is demonstrated. • Philosophical vocabulary is not used or is consistently used inappropriately. Points are frequently inaccurate and unclear. There are few, if any, references to the text. • The response is descriptive. Any analysis present is superficial or incoherent. Examples are not included or are irrelevant. There is little or no discussion of different points of view. Where a conclusion is included, this is very superficial or is not consistent with the rest of the response.
4–6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A basic understanding of and critical engagement with the specified concept/issue/argument from the prescribed text is demonstrated. • Philosophical vocabulary is used, but often inappropriately. Points are frequently imprecise or vague, and it is often unclear what the response is trying to convey. There are occasional references to the text. • There is limited analysis present and overall the response is more descriptive than analytical. Examples are included but are ineffective. There is limited discussion of different points of view. A simplistic conclusion is included.
7–9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some understanding of and critical engagement with the specified concept/issue/argument from the prescribed text is demonstrated. • Philosophical vocabulary is used, sometimes appropriately. Relevant points are made but lack accuracy and development. Specific references to the text are made, although these are sometimes ineffective. • The response contains analysis, although this analysis lacks development. Examples are included. There is some discussion of different points of view. A conclusion is included.
10–12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Good understanding of and critical engagement with the specified concept/issue/argument from the text is demonstrated. • Philosophical vocabulary is used, mostly appropriately. Points made are relevant and accurate but lack detail. There are specific references to the text. • The response contains critical analysis, although this analysis lacks development. Examples are used to support the discussion. There is discussion of different points of view. The response argues to a conclusion that is consistent with the arguments presented.
13–15	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very good understanding of and critical engagement with the specified concept/issue/argument from the text is demonstrated. • There is accurate and precise use of philosophical vocabulary. Points are relevant, accurate and detailed. There are specific and effective references to the text. • The response contains well-developed critical analysis. Relevant examples are used to support the discussion. There is critical discussion of different points of view. The response argues to a reasoned and clearly stated conclusion that is consistent with the arguments presented.

Alfred Jules Ayer: *Language, Truth and Logic*

1. (a) Explain Ayer’s critique of metaphysics. [10]

(b) Evaluate Ayer’s critique of metaphysics. [15]

Ayer’s critique of this metaphysical thesis forms the backbone of his analysis in Chapter 1. He takes the case of those who believe that it is possible to have knowledge of a transcendent reality as the starting point for his discussion, claiming that the arguments he uses to refute them “will subsequently be found to apply to the whole of metaphysics” (p.13). He goes on to explain that one way to attack a metaphysician who claims to have knowledge of a reality beyond the phenomenal world, “would be to require from what premises his propositions were deduced” (p.13). The analysis continues with the development of considerations on the possibility of presenting premises of an empirical nature or, if not, of resorting to justification in an intellectual intuition. The first initial assessment of all this shows that what is required is “a criticism of the nature of the actual statements which comprise” (p.14) a system of transcendent metaphysics. Central to Ayer’s analysis is the contrast between the critical thesis put forward and the idea “that it is possible to be a metaphysician without believing in a transcendent reality” (p.13).

Part A: When explaining, students may refer to:

- the purpose and method of philosophy
- Kant’s rejection of metaphysics based on the idea that metaphysicians ignore the limits of the human understanding
- Ayer’s opposition to Kant: the accusation against them is that they disobey the rules governing the significant use of language
- verifiability as a criterion for testing the significance of alleged statements of fact
- the distinction between conclusive and partial verification.

Part B: When evaluating, students may refer to:

- traditional approaches to metaphysics: empiricism and rationalism, for example, Locke, Hume and Descartes
- Is philosophy almost exclusively an activity of analysis?
- the extent to which the metaphysical sentences express neither tautologies nor empirical hypotheses, e.g. Carnap
- Does linguistic confusion as the primary source of metaphysics fully explain the nature and scope of metaphysics?
- the extent to which propositions can be conclusively verified
- ways of understanding knowledge and the possibility of metaphysics
- metaphysics, poetry and art, e.g. Heidegger.

2. (a) Explain Ayer’s claim that ethics should give an analysis of ethical terms. [10]
- (b) Evaluate Ayer’s claim that ethics should give an analysis of ethical terms. [15]

For Ayer, the usual systems of ethics are “far from being a homogeneous whole” (p.104). They contain bits of metaphysics, analyses of non-ethical concepts, and, more importantly, their “actual ethical contents are themselves of very different kinds” (p.105). He identifies four main classes: propositions expressing definitions of ethical concepts or judgements about the legitimacy of certain definitions; propositions describing the phenomena of moral experience; exhortations to moral virtue; and, finally, actual ethical judgements. According to him, the distinction between these four classes “is commonly ignored by ethical philosophers, with the result that it is often very difficult to tell from their works what it is that they are seeking to discover or prove” (p.105). He goes on to state that “only the first of our four classes, namely that which comprises the propositions relating to the definitions of ethical terms, can be said to constitute ethical philosophy” (p.105). This clarifies the task of ethics, but it is immediately subject to the objection from other points of view that it limits, if not impoverishes, ethical reflection. These opposing views might be illustrated by the varieties of phenomenology (e.g. Scheler) or the dialogical ethics of Taylor which take a broader or more inclusive view of ethical reflection.

Part A: When explaining, students may refer to:

- the view that all synthetic propositions are empirical hypotheses as a basis for ethical analysis
- the distinction between descriptive and normative ethical statements
- the normative ethical concepts are not reducible to the empirical concepts
- the idea that value judgements are not scientific statements but emotional ones
- the empiricist approach as a challenge to the metaphysical foundation of ethics.

Part B: When evaluating, students may refer to:

- the extent to which it is possible to define ethical concepts
- comparison and contrast with other ethical theories or approaches, for example: virtue theories, deontological theories or teleological theories
- the extent to which the main (if not only) task of philosophy should be the analysis of propositions and definitions
- Ayer’s approach and the current broadening of ethical horizons, e.g. environmental ethics
- the approach to metaphysics as a kind of misplaced poetry and the corresponding view of ethics as an expression of feelings or emotions
- Is the proposal to construct ethics as an analysis of ethical concepts a kind of mathematization of ethics? Spinoza’s *Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata*.

Simone de Beauvoir: *The Second Sex*, Vol. 1 part 1, Vol. 2 part 1 and Vol. 2 part 4

3. (a) **Explain de Beauvoir’s account of the tensions that arise between the girl and her parents.** [10]
- (b) **Evaluate de Beauvoir’s account of the tensions that arise between the girl and her parents.** [15]

This question points mostly towards volume 2 chapter 1 (Childhood), though references can be made to other chapters as well. De Beauvoir describes the girl’s childhood as a transition from naïve expectations about her own freedom towards the realization that she is “destined for another” and will not be treated as equal to men. This transition is facilitated by the parents, who are at once a source of love and of antagonism for the girl. Students should identify specific tensions between parents and children from de Beauvoir’s description, such as the frustrations that arise from being punished by one you love, or the girl rejecting her mother while at the same time realizing that she is destined for motherhood herself. Successful responses may also distinguish between the relationship with the mother and with the father, which are revealed early on to be different and unequal. Students might connect the tensions they identified with deeper philosophical themes of the book, such as alienation, immanence, or bad faith. They might also comment on the cyclical nature of parenting, with tensions handed down from one generation to another being both the cause and the effect of patriarchal oppression. Students may also wish to challenge de Beauvoir’s pessimism by refuting her sense of fatalism or by pointing towards more positive and nurturing aspects of the parent-child relationship.

Note that another chapter, Motherhood, deals explicitly with the given question, but is not included in the core text prescription. Students are not expected to refer to material from this chapter, though if they do so successfully, they should still be awarded credit.

Part A: When explaining, students may refer to:

- the confusions of early childhood, and the early privilege of girls over boys (p.296)
- the girl who treats her doll the same way her mother treats her (p.307)
- the child’s early curiosity and later alienation around the topic of procreation (pp.308, 324)
- the child who learns that the mother is “inferior” to the father (p.312), and the role of media, religion and mythology (p.313)
- rebellion against the mother (p.319)
- the mother’s (lack of) communication around puberty, menstruation and sexual initiation (p.334).

Part B: When evaluating, students may refer to:

- mothers “imposing their destiny” on daughters (p.306)
- abandonment and the painful process of weaning (p.294)
- de Beauvoir’s revision of Freud’s Electra and Oedipus complex (pp.54, 298)
- the transparency of the mother’s role vs the mystery of the father’s role (p.307)
- alienation between the child and the mother
- the assumption of a heteronormative family throughout *The Second Sex*
- the ways in which early childhood experiences affect later life (i.e. in Volume 2, Chapter 4)
- other interpretations of the bond that exists between a mother and a daughter (i.e. Irigaray, Kristeva).

4. (a) **Explain the significance of males assuming active roles and females assuming passive roles according to de Beauvoir.** [10]
- (b) **Evaluate the significance of males assuming active roles and females assuming passive roles according to de Beauvoir.** [15]

This question invites students to relate males and females to the concepts of activity and passivity, two key concepts which occur throughout *The Second Sex*. De Beauvoir describes many situations where activity privileges men and passivity damages women, in childhood, sexual relations, the workplace, and beyond. Students may identify some of these situations and connect these situations to deeper philosophical themes of *The Second Sex*. For instance, students may formulate how passive existence leads the girl towards bad faith, or how confronting one’s own passivity leads to various forms of alienation. Others may wish to focus on the word “role” and explore the ways in which gender roles are arbitrary, inauthentic, or socially constructed. Students might find some way of evaluating de Beauvoir’s reliance on the male-active/female-passive correlation. For instance, some students may wish to show how active/passive gender roles create a vicious cycle (p.393) and explore the ways in which we can challenge or divert them. Others may challenge whether the idea of activity and passivity are the right way of characterizing male-female relations and consider the ways in which it is (in)consistent with de Beauvoir’s self-proclaimed anti-essentialism, or whether it overlooks the concept of power.

Part A: When explaining, students may refer to:

- fertilization and the “vital principles” of maintaining vs creating (pp.27, 381)
- the asymmetries of sexual intercourse and penetration (pp.35, 36, 346, 397, 398, 401, 408)
- the idea of empowering women in the workplace, and its mixed success and failure to bring about equality (pp.65, 739)
- boys being given an “apprenticeship in violence” (p.354) and the advantages of physical strength (p.45)
- the penis as a symbol of activity and transcendence (p.298)
- the frustrating passivity of housework (p.357).

Part B: When evaluating, students may refer to:

- the active-passive distinction in Aristotle, Hegel and various other classical philosophers (p.25)
- the causes and consequences of gender roles, and the possibility of changing them
- the consequences of the girl’s encounter with her own passivity: envy (p.311), bad faith (pp.361, 381), narcissism (p.372), rebellion (p.376), masochism (pp.378, 425), frigidity (p.404)
- Why do males and females need to complement each other? (p.53)
- the ways in which activity and passivity can be transcended, for instance in sexual union (pp.29, 401, 422), or poetry and nature(pp.385–388); de Beauvoir’s inconsistencies around accepting or rejecting the concepts of active/passive (pp.38, 57)
- lesbianism as a way of finding activity and rejecting male power (pp.366, 431, 436)
- the challenge that the active-passive distinction is itself a relic of patriarchy or essentialism (i.e. Bell Hooks, *From Margin to Center*)
- activity and passivity as performative elements of gender (i.e. Butler, *Gender Trouble*); feminist forms of activism

Confucius: *The Analects*

5. (a) Explain Confucius’s views on humaneness/benevolence (*ren*). [10]

(b) Evaluate Confucius’s views on humaneness/benevolence (*ren*). [15]

This question invites an explanation and evaluation of Confucian views on humaneness/benevolence (*ren*). Reference might be made to 9.1 suggesting no clear definition of humaneness/benevolence, yet in many sections Confucius either negatively or positively suggests what can be seen as humaneness/benevolence. In 13.19 he suggests how humaneness/ benevolence can be seen privately and publicly. In 12.2 Confucius equates practicing humaneness/benevolence as behaving so that you would do unto others what you would not do to yourself. The breadth of qualities that are associated with humaneness/benevolence comes to the fore. These are enduring adversity and enjoying prosperity but tolerating all people. Yet Confucius is pragmatic in accepting that the pursuit of humaneness/benevolence will not be constant and not easy (4.6). Humaneness/benevolence also must be a deliberate act reflecting rituals (*li*) and righteousness (*yi*) (8.2) which include a virtuous man (*junzi*) committing acts that please the common people. It is assumed that humans are not inherently humane/benevolent but can learn humaneness/benevolence by practicing the key virtues of deference/filial piety (*xiao*), the enactment of rites, and being able to control oneself, in words and action (17.17). Parallels might be drawn with Plato’s idea on the “Good” and how there is a fluidity of precise definitions, and types of defined behaviour along with moral certitude. The pragmatic side of ideas associated with humaneness/benevolence might also be paralleled with western liberalism.

Part A: When explaining, students may refer to:

- the nature of virtue and a virtuous person
- the nature of the virtuous person (*junzi*) as a person who must demonstrate humaneness/benevolence (*ren*)
- the role of rites and rituals (*li*) as part of humaneness/benevolence in everyday life
- the “Doctrine of the Mean” and the pragmatic nature of Confucius
- types of qualities that might fit into the idea of humaneness/benevolence: thoughts, behaviours attitudes and aptitudes
- the advantages and disadvantages of behaviours that do not disturb or challenge existing norms
- the Confucian understanding of the nature of humans—not purely good nor bad but “human”.

Part B: When evaluating, students may refer to:

- the possible link between Plato’s idea of the “Good” and the idea of Confucian goodness when it is equated with *ren* (more absolute) rather than *shan*—the latter merely being morally right actions
- Is the Confucian definition of good (12.1) too negative compared to a Christian New Testament version of the Golden Rule “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you” (Matt 7:12), does this reflect a more realistic nature of how humans behave, or not?
- linking consequentialism with Confucian humaneness/benevolence
- the pragmatic nature of Confucian, accepting the imperfection of humans
- western liberalism and importance of reason and rulers having to model moral people
- problems associated with imprecision of definitions means that Confucian contradictions might limit his ability maintain a very fixed, controlled society
- problems associated with valuing motives equal to outcomes in terms of behaviour
- the response to the way a deviant behaves within a Confucian society focused on humaneness/benevolence
- humaneness/benevolence and Mill’s “harm principle” along with Jainism.

6. (a) Explain the Confucian view of knowledge (*zhi*). [10]
- (b) Evaluate the Confucian view of knowledge (*zhi*). [15]

The key to understanding Confucius’s relationship to knowledge (*zhi*) is accepting one of his basic premises in that real knowledge is knowing one’s ignorance. Knowledge is active and is a means of illuminating the world (7.19). The source of much knowledge is the past and past experiences so awareness and learning from experience becomes a route to knowledge (7.19). Seeking knowledge is the means both of completing past understandings (7.8) (finding the other three corners of the square) and increasing levels of self-understanding. This approach of how knowledge and understanding can be developed might be seen as akin to a Socratic method. Therefore, for Confucius knowledge is not dissimilar as one aspect of the *Tao* (or the Way) for a Taoist. Sources of knowledge are perhaps threefold—inner reflection, observation of the world and learning from others even those who are lesser people (5.14). A submission of all knowing to both rites and rituals (*li*) seems central to a Confucian approach to knowledge. Within section 2 the steps to enact worthwhile knowledge seem to be outlined 2.15, stressing the role of thinking, while 2.17 stresses the need to understand the limits of one’s knowledge.

Part A: When explaining, students may refer to:

- ways of acquiring knowledge both passive and active
- the role of books people and direct experience in developing knowledge (*zhi*)
- experiential forms of education; self-realization as source of knowledge
- the relationship of knowledge acquisition and the virtuous man (*junzi*)
- knowledge and the interaction with rites and rituals (*li*)
- the role of knowledge and its impact on social mobility and Confucius’s reaction to this
- the education process at the time of Confucius and the hierarchies within the society.

Part B: When evaluating, students may refer to:

- the interplay between learning (*xue*), knowledge, and paradigm shifts
- the relationship of imagination and knowledge; parallels might be drawn with Einstein’s view on the status of imagination
- the relationship of knowledge to virtue, rites, and rituals
- limiting access to knowledge and the relationships between “petty people” (*xiaoren*) and the virtuous person (*junzi*)
- Dewey and experiential education and Confucius’s view on how knowledge is acquired
- the degree to which Confucius could reconcile a product of increased knowledge, being social progress yet advocate maintaining a stable and ordered society
- contrasts might be made with Plato; on knowledge, the Socratic method and aspects of education
- the degree to which enlightenment (a product of knowledge growth) was limited to the inner self rather than social change.

René Descartes: *Meditations on First Philosophy*

7. (a) **Explain Descartes’s theory concerning ideas.** [10]
 (b) **Evaluate Descartes’s theory concerning ideas.** [15]

This question asks for an explanation and evaluation of Descartes’s theory concerning ideas as formulated in Meditation 3. Descartes opens his arguments with an inventory of what he knows clearly and distinctly as true, e.g. that he exists as a thinking substance which doubts, affirms, denies, understands, imagines and has sensations. For Descartes the mind is a substance, thinking is an attribute of that substance, and an idea is a mode of thinking that represents objects to the mind. An idea is a form of thought which possesses formal reality since it is an existing thing produced by the mind and possesses objective reality since it can be a representation of something. Ideas are then divided into three types: factitious which are produced by the mind and can be controlled and manipulated by the mind; adventitious which are produced by some external thing and cannot be controlled or manipulated by the mind; innate which the mind finds as present in itself, are derived by the use of reason and cannot be manipulated nor denied. The three types of ideas are differentiated based on their origins. Additionally, Descartes considers that ideas can be understood materially as pure acts of the mind and objectively as representing objects which exist outside the mind. In Meditation 3 Descartes states that he is not yet able to conclude clearly and indubitably that objects actually exist outside the mind and, therefore, needs to deal conclusively with the possibility of being deceived by demonstrating the existence of a God who does not deceive (Meditations 3 and 5) and the existence of material objects (Meditation 6).

Part A: When explaining, students may refer to:

- the nature of factitious (creations of the mind with no claim to objective reality), innate (clear and distinct ideas found in the mind itself with no apparent physical origin) and adventitious ideas (ideas with apparently external, sensory origins)
- ideas as a simple mode of thinking produced by the intellect which represents objects to the mind
- ideas as forms of perception; the reliability of sense perception
- ideas as purely mental images with their content existing only in the mind vs ideas as objects present to the mind which represent objects as they really exist independently of the mind
- ideas as mental images; ideas as illusions; the formal and objective reality of ideas
- ideas erroneously believed to be true by “spontaneous inclination” vs ideas confirmed to be true by the “natural light”.

Part B: When evaluating, students may refer to:

- Is it always necessary to question the relationship of ideas to their source in mind-independent, external objects, e.g. Berkeley’s view that ideas are purely mind-dependent?
- we are not deceived by our sense-based perceptions as representing objectively existing, mind-independent objects, e.g. J. L. Austin’s view that we always received reliable sense-data; Russell’s views concerning sense-data
- the defensibility of Descartes’s theory of innate ideas, e.g. the rejection of innate ideas by Locke and Hume
- Is direct realism possible within the context of Descartes’s theory of ideas, e.g. similarities with Russell’s rejection of direct realism? Does Descartes’s theory of ideas threaten reliable cognitive access to reality? Comparisons of Plato’s theory of ideas with Descartes’s theory of ideas
- factitious ideas: illusion, delusion, hallucination, error
- Does Descartes’s theory concerning ideas actually generate the problems associated with the relationship of the knower and the known?
- possible methods for the confirmation of the reliability of Descartes’s adventitious ideas: e.g. the pragmatism of James, Pierce and Dewey; the coherence theory of Kant, Hegel, Brand Blanscard, Nicholas Rescher; the verification theory of Rudolf Carnap and A. J. Ayer
- Is Descartes’s theory of ideas an example of representationalism (ideas are mental objects only) or of direct realism (ideas present in the mind can be of objects which are mind-independent)?

8. (a) Explain Descartes’s ontological proof for the existence of God. [10]
- (b) Evaluate Descartes’s ontological proof for the existence of God. [15]

This question asks for an explanation and evaluation of Descartes’s ontological proof for the existence of God as presented in Meditation 5. While the ontological argument stands independently of Descartes’s cosmological argument presented in Meditation 3, some reference might be made to the cosmological argument. The ontological argument is set within the context of Descartes’s attempt to do away with doubt and deceit and to know with certainty of the existence of material things. By considering the clear, distinctly known and true ideas of arithmetic, geometry and pure mathematics, which he judges to be already known and not inventions of his own mind, Descartes asks whether he can follow a similar approach regarding the existence of God. He affirms that he does find the clear and distinct idea of a supremely perfect being in his mind. While he can distinguish existence from essence regarding some of the things he finds in his mind, he cannot do this with the idea of God. It would be a contradiction to conceive of God as not existing; existence is a required attribute of a supremely perfect God. It is not my thinking that imposes this conclusion but the necessity of the idea of God itself. Whenever I think of God, I must credit God with all perfections and existence is the most important of them. Finally, Descartes concludes that the idea of God does not proceed from him; it is an innate idea found in the mind without any empirical origin.

Part A: When explaining, students may refer to:

- the nature of the ontological argument as a deductive, *a priori*, rational mode of argumentation
- the existence of a supremely perfect God required to dispel the possibility of doubt and deceit as well as to guarantee the existence of material things
- existence as a necessary attribute of a supremely perfect being; contingent existence vs necessary existence; similarities with other ontological arguments, e.g. Anselm, Duns Scotus, James Ross, the Kalam argument
- the nature of innate ideas: not inventions of my mind, not dependent on sense experience, having clear and indubitable content of their own; the truths of arithmetic, geometry and pure mathematics as examples of innate ideas; the innate idea of God as the most important example of an innate idea
- deriving the existence of God from a logical analysis of concepts; a supremely perfect God who does not exist is a contradiction
- the impossibility of separating necessary existence from the essence of God, e.g. Hegel, N. Malcolm
- the very existence of God, not the inventions of my mind, is what compels me to affirm the necessary existence of God; affirming necessary existence entails affirming all other perfections of God.

Part B: When evaluating, students may refer to:

- the legitimacy of the movement from logical to ontological existence, e.g. John Hick’s appraisal of Descartes’s ontological argument
- criticisms of Descartes notion of innate ideas, e.g. Locke, Hume, Aristotle
- similarities of Descartes’s innate ideas and Plato’s theory of recollection of the knowledge of the Forms
- Gaunilo’s objections to the connection of existence to the idea of a perfect entity. e.g. Anselm’s ontological argument
- Pierre Gassendi’s objections to Descartes’s use of existence as a property attributable to the idea of a supremely perfect God
- Kant’s objections to Descartes’s ontological argument
- Descartes’s ontological argument as an example of circular reasoning/begging the question, e.g. Schopenhauer’s estimation of the weaknesses of Descartes’s arguments
- the impossibility of positing logically existing entities, e.g. J. N. Findlay’s position on Descartes’s ontological argument; how convincing is Descartes’s ontological argument?
- a supremely perfect, existing being is not contrary to reason as maximum excellence could exist in a possible world, e.g. Plantinga’s assessment of an ontological argument for the existence of God.

Frantz Fanon: *Black Skin, White Masks*

9. (a) **Explain Fanon’s account of how the white gaze affects the lived experience of the black man.** [10]
- (b) **Evaluate Fanon’s account of how the white gaze affects the lived experience of the black man.** [15]

In Chapter 5, Fanon begins with a phrase, “Look! A Negro!”. This chapter comes after Fanon has given explanations of his theory of the inferiority complex which emerges in the colonized population as an essential part of the colonial experience. Fanon also undertakes a psychoanalytic approach to the experience of being colonized, but in Chapter 5, he explores concepts, previously mentioned, to look intensely at the experience of coloured people under colonial rule. For a colonizer to use the word, “negro” is to engage in racism. It is not the racist intention of using the phrase, but the mere use of it that constitutes racism. The white gaze cannot avoid this essential consequence. Fanon uses Sartre’s famous work on antisemitism, where Sartre gives an account of how language used in one standpoint pins down the identity of the “other”. However, Fanon sees anti-Black racism as different from antisemitism, because anti-Black racism reflects a judgement of superiority by the speaker, as opposed to the fear of being inferior to Jewish people in antisemitism. Fanon explores the features of the inferiority complex (which run through the book) and looks at how some racism is generated by the black community itself through a complex form of internalization. Thus, the white gaze is not the sole cause of the inferiority complex.

Part A: When explaining, students may refer to:

- being-for-others is avoided if the black man remains on home territory
- the white gaze is investigated through the anecdote of the boy who declares, “Look! A Negro!”
- ontology is insufficient in understanding the being of the black man, because it does not take into account the lived experience; the consistent turn to the personal feeling of inferiority
- the notion that there could be an investigation into the physical attributes of the black man—the “body schema”, but Fanon realizes the key area for investigation is not his body, but his skin
- the “historical-racial schema” data provided by the other—the white person
- the black person, avoided in the train, is responsible not just for himself, but for his race and ancestors
- “The black man is a toy in the hands of the white man” and the notion of Blackness as like an injury to a war veteran.

Part B: When evaluating, students may refer to:

- Is Fanon’s pessimism about any possibility of universalizing factors (even as basic as physiology) unreasonable or unconvincing—“I do not have to look for the universal”, “I am fully what I am”?
- Is his account of Sartre’s treatment of antisemitism vis-à-vis anti-Black racism convincing?
- Does this account of the notion of being “othered” convince?
- Is this a convincing account of the ‘white gaze’ given the main anecdote developed to illustrate involves the exclamations of a child?
- How convincing is his conclusion that the white person prescribes “for me the humility of the cripple”?
- Fanon’s account of Césaire and their relationship and his work on negritude
- the replacing of the black past with the inevitable superiority of the colonizer’s scientific, industrialized present.

10. (a) **Explain Fanon’s views of the Hegelian dialectic in his understanding of the recognition of blackness.** [10]
- (b) **Evaluate Fanon’s views of the Hegelian dialectic in his understanding of the recognition of blackness.** [15]

Fanon considers Hegel’s dialectical perspective, which posits that individuals become aware of their uniqueness through interactions with others. In the seventh and final chapter, Fanon considers the position of Hegel’s dialectic position that individuals become aware of themselves as unique individuals through their interactions with others. Fanon is critical of this. He thinks that this could end up in an understanding of interactions between Blacks and Whites, that understanding is predicated on the white perspective. Fanon rejects the conception of recognition that appeals to a form of humanity that does not recognize racial-ness—as there is no understanding of a human that does not involve the consideration of race. Fanon rejects any notion that recognition might be based on quantifiable standards imposed by Europeans. The issue is that any recognition of Blackness is done through white eyes. There is no escaping the role of the colonizer in the life of the colonized. Fanon thinks that there might be a possibility of transformation if members of the different communities ask the right questions. The task is to explore those assumed forms of relation that enables the white gaze to dominate above the experience of the coloured person. In its place Fanon wants “[to] induce man to be actional”.

Part A: When explaining, students may refer to:

- Fanon’s view of Hegel’s dialectical approach
- recognition as the cause of self-consciousness—“that is to say, it is only by being acknowledged and recognized”
- the dialectical approach ends up with a European perspective on Blacks dictated by their former status as slaves, so they do not recognize Black people as themselves
- there is a pre-conceived view of what a human is, which excludes taking into account Black people
- Fanon’s view is that the black person contributes to the misapprehension of the colonizer just as the colonizer does from the subjective perspective of power; Black people through their dependency on the White people contribute, as well
- the dialectic reinforces anti-Black racism and a different approach is needed.

Part B: When evaluating, students may refer to:

- Is Fanon’s historical account a reliable enough one for the thesis he has about the colonial experience?
- Is the Hegelian dialectic a convincing account of human essence?
- see Paulo Freire and his work on the oppressed
- Is the insistence on the black inferiority complex justified?
- Fanon speaks of the black man becoming “actional”—is this a call to resistance and confrontation? See the historical context of Fanon’s work in Algeria
- Fanon seeks a total break with the past, is this achievable and to be recommended?
- examples of dialectics, e.g. Marx, Plato, Sartre.

John Stuart Mill: *On Liberty*

11. (a) **Explain Mill’s views on how the freedoms of thought and of action might be threatened.** [10]
- (b) **Evaluate Mill’s views on how the freedoms of thought and of action might be threatened.** [15]

This question asks for an explanation and evaluation of Mill’s views on the ways in which the freedoms of thought and action might be threatened. Responses can range widely through a variety of views drawn from the arguments Mill proposes in the various chapters of the text, especially Chapters I through IV. Mill’s views rest upon his belief that liberty of the will along with civil and social liberty are crucial to the happiness of the individual, the development of good character and the improvement of society. Against this backdrop and engaging the “harm principle” any interference by any authority is not permissible except in those cases where freedom of thought and action brings harm to individuals or the society at large. The earliest threats to the fundamental liberties of individuals were found in ancient societies where those who ruled did so in their own interests were unaccountable to those who were ruled. As societies evolved, Mill argues that the freedom of thought and action came to be threatened, for example, by the pressures exerted by “the tyranny of the majority”, the possible tyranny of the opinions of a minority, the restrictions exerted by “the despotism of custom”, the presumption of infallibility in deciding what is best for the individual, the suppression of discussion and debate of opinions, the restrictions of civil and criminal law, and the influence of the market economy and ownership of private property. Concerns with the effectiveness of the education system, prejudice regarding religious and moral points of view and the failure to take seriously the guidance of a well-educated individual or “genius” can be considered.

Part A: When explaining, students may refer to:

- the primacy of the principles of freedom of thought, expression and action; the “harm principle” as the only principle warranting interference with the personal or collective liberty of thought, expression and action; the emergence, in history, of the governed demanding to establish and defend their rights and liberties in opposition to the restrictions imposed by those governing
- Mill’s description of “the tyranny of the majority”; the evolution of the notion of “the will of the people” into the notion of “the will of the most numerous”; the possibility of the emergence of the pressures of the opinions of a minority
- the “despotism of custom”; custom as a threat to variety, creativity and innovation in modes of living, thinking and acting; silencing or ignoring the input of well-developed, well-educated individuals—the “genius”; the silencing of discussion of opinions; the presumption of infallibility by the individual, a minority or the majority
- legitimate legal, criminal, moral and religious limitations of freedom in the spirit of the “harm principle” vs persecution, prejudice, ignorance.

Part B: When evaluating, students may refer to:

- the limits of freedom of thought, expression and action in society: legitimate vs illegitimate
- Is “the tyranny of the majority” an inevitability in any society? e.g. comparisons with the views of Plato, Aristotle, James Madison, de Tocqueville
- Does the “harm principle” adequately protect freedom of thought, expression and action? e.g. Joel Feinberg’s defence of Mill’s articulation of the “harm principle” vs H. L. A. Hart’s rejection of the principle
- custom, tradition and customary behaviour patterns as limitations to freedom of thought, expression and action, e.g. Nietzsche’s exploration of the morality of custom
- claims to infallibility as threats to freedom of thought, e.g. consider similarities with Descartes’s claim to achieve clear, indubitable and certain knowledge or Mark Kaplan’s defence of infallibilism
- contemporary threats to freedom of thought and action, e.g. ghosting, gaslighting, suspension of social media accounts, shadow banning, cancel culture, censorship of published materials

- socio-economic factors as limitations on freedom of thought, expression and action, e.g. Amartya Sen's view that socio-economic development entails the expansion of the right to make choices freely
- freedom inevitably entails some forms of limitation, e.g. comparison with Mill's "harm principle" and the prohibitions of, for example, The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) regarding discrimination, cruel and degrading treatment, and infringements on privacy and reputation.

12. (a) Explain Mill’s understanding of self-regarding actions. [10]
- (b) Evaluate Mill’s understanding of self-regarding actions. [15]

This question asks for an explanation and evaluation of Mill’s understanding of self-regarding conduct that affects the interests of the agent only. His views are set out in Chapter IV of the text. Mill’s approach is guided by his “harm principle”, founded upon his view of the primacy of the liberty principle which gives priority to personal freedom over all expressions of self-regarding action save those which fall into the context of the “harm principle”, and mindful of determining the rightful limit to the sovereignty of the individual over him or herself. While inspired by an attempt to establish, as far as possible, absolute freedom in the realm of self-regarding actions, Mill still sets this vision into the context of wider concerns. For example, individuals have a civic obligation to follow the laws and rules which protect all members of society, to respect the legitimate rights of others, to contribute to the defence of the society at large and to avoid harming the reputation of others. Other than that, an individual, in full sovereignty over him or herself, has “perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the consequences” when the action affects only the interests of that individual and no one else. Individuals have the obligation to develop self-regarding virtues, to be mindful of the development of their higher mental and moral faculties, to seek the support of others in acting rightly in their own interests and to remain sensitive to the feelings of others. However, in the end, the individual is the final judge but must be prepared to accept the disdain, distaste, contempt and avoidance of others when the individual’s actions offend others. Legal measures limiting self-regarding actions are to be enacted only in the extreme.

Part A: When explaining, students may refer to:

- the primacy of the principle of freedom of thought, expression and action
- the sovereignty of the individual over him or herself; circumstances that may mitigate for restrictions on that sovereignty
- self-regarding actions in themselves; self-regarding actions as harmful to the agent performing them; self-regarding actions as they impact on others
- self-regarding actions and self-regarding virtues; development of moral and mental faculties for the improvement of personal character; courage, temperance, honesty, prudence, industry, justice as self-regarding virtues that diminish the possibility of harming others
- individuals who manifest self-regarding virtues and perform self-regarding actions accordingly can be praised; those who do not can be punished by shame, contempt, distaste and avoidance
- self-regarding actions vs legitimate civic and social responsibilities; laws, rules and approved customs; the freedom to perform self-regarding acts promotes happiness for the individual as well as for the society; restriction of self-regarding acts reduces individual and social happiness and impedes personal and societal progress and development.

Part B: When evaluating, students may refer to:

- self-regarding actions emerge from the spirit of freedom, creativity and spontaneity and can serve personal improvement and development
- the extent to which an individual can legitimately do harm to him or herself - legal, moral and religious restrictions
- the cultivation of self-regarding virtues as promoting the best interests of the agent, e.g. Plato’s views on justice in the best interests of the individual
- Are self-regarding actions at the same time other-regarding actions? e.g. the views of J. C. Rees and James F. Stephan
- acting in the interests of the self vs acting in the interests of the others: similarities Confucius’s notion of the “petty person” (*xiaoren*) and the “virtuous person” (*junzi*) or Henry Sidgwick’s view that we should abandon our pursuit of personal interests in favour of the welfare of others
- Are self-regarding actions immune to the pressures of the views of the majority or the influence of prevailing customs?
- Is the “harm principle” a sufficient criterion to limit the impact of self-regarding actions on the self and others?
- Is there a difference of preventing non-consensual harm as opposed to preventing harm between consenting individuals?
- contemporary applications of the place of self-regarding actions, e.g. environmental protection and self-interest; self-interest and immigration issues; self-interest and profit taking.

Friedrich Nietzsche: *The Genealogy of Morals*

13. (a) **Explain Nietzsche’s view about the relationship of bad conscience and suffering. [10]**
- (b) **Evaluate Nietzsche’s view about the relationship of bad conscience and suffering. [15]**

This question seeks explanation of the relationship between bad conscience and suffering that primarily draws on Nietzsche’s ideas based in the second essay of the *Genealogy*. It links the notion of conscience and its origins with ideas of pleasure and pain (II p.67). The idea of conscience arises out of the development of Nietzsche’s ideas on memory—conscience being a “late fruit of the tree of memory” (II p.3). By making a promise one takes responsibility, and therefore the failure to fulfil the promise creates a sense of bad conscience. This experience of bad conscience removes the idea of pleasure from human experience. Consequently, humans, as slaves, live in a state of bad conscience, not experiencing pleasure. The state of bad consciousness is in fact the recognition of guilt. Noble active humans (II p.11) who are aggressive are more content with themselves and consequently have no bad conscience and can experience pleasure to the full. Yet this is condemned by the ascetic priest as to experience pleasure is often seen as bad. You feel guilty in enjoying something and hence the spiral of bad conscience continues, resulting in loss or suppression of pleasure. For Nietzsche a model of social relationships is established by the interaction of people as creditor/debtor a relationship in which one side receives pleasure and the other pain.

Part A: When explaining, students may refer to:

- definitions of bad conscience and the links between debt and guilt; the links between bad conscience and slave morality
- the idea that pleasure is gained by a repayment of debt or an action of revenge resulting in the suffering of others because the debt has not been paid
- the removal or reduction of pleasure because humans are discouraged from acting instinctively; the links between pleasure and the mercy of nobles
- pleasure seeking being not a selfish act but an instinctive state of self-fulfillment
- the role of the ascetic priest and religion in attempting to justify suffering and reduction of pleasure
- whether the state as the “supreme creditor” has a role in decreasing the suffering of its citizens, hence increasing their pleasure.

Part B: When evaluating, students may refer to:

- the idea that nature may have made a false link between debt and guilt; there might be a stronger link between debt and revenge, revenge might be a source of pleasure
- links might be made to Freud and the idea of self-gratification
- Nietzsche’s insight into the origins of kindness and goodwill and the gaining of pleasure
- Is modern society with its dependence on therapies and focus on individual mental health suffering a collective bad conscience? The attempts to remove guilt and indebtedness to increase pleasure
- the suppression of Freud’s notion of “super ego” and its psychological consequences
- the degree to which Nietzsche is reflective of the nature of society at his time in that much of European society thought that fulfilment of pleasure was sinful and any desire for pleasure would produce a bad conscience—guilt, societal pressures which create series of illness—bad conscience (II p.16)
- consideration that Nietzsche might be reflective of Darwin even though he rejects Darwin’s “reactivism” (II p.12)—adaptation as the mere act of reacting; humans (nobles) should be active not reactive—the noble is the “active man” (II p.12); it being a natural desire to seek pleasure
- differences between the morality of slaves and nobles; the role of responsibility and a sense of accountability in progressive liberal societies.

14. (a) **Explain Nietzsche’s view that the human relationship to nature is one of *hubris* (excessive pride).** [10]
- (b) **Evaluate Nietzsche’s view that the human relationship to nature is one of *hubris* (excessive pride).** [15]

This question seeks an explanation and evaluation of Nietzsche’s claim in the third essay, section 9, that humans, with a slave morality have superiority over nature, a self-confidence and “violate nature” (p.113). Humans through machines and “heedless inventiveness against it (nature)” wish to dominate it. The slave is substituting nature for fellow humans, as humans should not be dominated. Nietzsche goes on to suggest that such an attitude is also applied to God. This can be seen as confirmation that scientists have become the new leaders of our world. The scientist and scientific values dominate decisions and become new gods and control the values of humans. Nietzsche seems to be taking a technophobic stance and wanting a more environmentalist relationship to nature. The knowledge that science establishes and the Christian belief in God setting humans above all creation is seen by Nietzsche as the undoing of humans and nature. Nietzsche seems very much against the idea that science and religion can be the saviours of humans. For him the scientist is the Ascetic Ideal *par excellence* as both would lead to control of the instinctive life, the morality of noble’s values. Both, priest and scientist suppress harmony with nature because they want control. The noble has a much more balanced perspective of the natural world.

Part A: When explaining, students may refer to:

- the ascetic ideal and its parallel with science; the nature of the ascetic priest as a scientist
- noble and slave morality in reference to humans and the natural world; human interactions with nature both positive and negative
- the idea that the hubris of humans—humans seeing themselves as gods might be presented as a contradiction in Nietzsche’s argumentation
- the “will to power” and its ability to diminish the humans and nature
- nobles for Nietzsche are instinctively strong and could be seen as in a state of nature
- the slave morality and “the sickness” (p.119) being weak, compassionate and humble and in contrast nobles with their morality having the ability to free themselves from “sickness”
- The nature of resentment and its relationship to human *hubris*. Is the recognition of resentment in itself *hubris*?

Part B: When evaluating, students may refer to:

- Does the overconfidence of humans lead to weakness or strength—a desire to understand and control human behaviour might lead to an understanding or misunderstanding of the interaction of humans and nature?
- Is *hubris* a sickness—can it produce the downfall of humans?
- the degree to which *ressentiment* might lead to a desire for more control—contrary to some Eastern philosophies purporting to advocate a harmony with nature and life itself
- the idea that science is the new religion and hence it offers the solution to all things—what Nietzsche sees as a trick to mislead humans
- the relationship of the environmental lobby and Nietzsche’s idea of the *hubris* of humans
- whether Nietzsche is misguided, and the scientist will act to protect nature rather than destroy it
- Has the scientist got an inherent responsibility to protect nature—a correspondence to a biblical stance and some eastern traditions where humans have a protective role of nature?
- Nietzsche’s skepticism of human rationality and of the freedom offered by the ascetic priest (III 9 p.113); for Nietzsche slave morality restricts freedom rather than enhances it.

Martha C. Nussbaum: *Creating Capabilities*: The Human Development Approach

15. (a) **Explain Nussbaum’s claim that the central capabilities support one another in many ways.** [10]
- (b) **Evaluate Nussbaum’s claim that the central capabilities support one another in many ways.** [15]

The question stems from Chapter 2 and invites an exploration of a central topic in Nussbaum’s text: the capabilities list. Students might focus on the list and highlight what Nussbaum defines as central capabilities. Responses might consider the reasons why the capabilities support one another, but students might also explore the reasons why Nussbaum holds that two capabilities play a distinctive role, that she defines “architectonic”: affiliation and practical reason. Practical reason is central, because its presence supports all other options and freedoms, being linked to the opportunity to choose. In similar ways, affiliation is central, because it is present when other capabilities respect human dignity. Students might pinpoint Nussbaum’s view on the importance of human relationships, which makes affiliation central: employment options should always consider workplace relationships. Finally, students might highlight the concept of community in Nussbaum’s view. Responses might refer to other views, e.g. the concept of human dignity in Kant, the concept of freedom in Mill, and the role of human relationship and care, e.g. Heidegger.

Part A: When explaining, students may refer to:

- the capabilities list
- central and basic capabilities
- internal capabilities and innate equipment
- the role of practical reason
- the role of affiliation
- the concept of dignity.

Part B: When evaluating, students may refer to:

- whether some capabilities are more important than others
- different views on freedom, e.g. Mill, Constant, Berlin, Bobbio
- whether affiliation as human relationship might be considered as an intrinsic value
- other views on affiliation, e.g. Aristotle’s view on friendship, Heidegger’s view on care
- risks linked to individual practical reason, e.g. Taylor’s view on instrumental reason, Ortega y Gasset’s revolt of the masses
- the concept of practical reason in other views, e.g. Kant.

16. (a) **Explain Nussbaum’s claim that no society that pursues equality can avoid curtailing freedom.** [10]
- (b) **Evaluate Nussbaum’s claim that no society that pursues equality can avoid curtailing freedom.** [15]

The question stems from Chapter 4 and invites an exploration of two central concepts in Nussbaum’s text: equality and freedom. Students might explain the reasons why Nussbaum holds that equality calls for a certain amount of limitation of freedom and explore some of the examples she offers, such as sexual harassment or non-consensual intercourse. Students might focus on the relationship between freedom and the capabilities: freedom has to be meant in terms of freedom to choose and the capabilities provide the proper framework for that meaning of freedom. Moreover, the capabilities list can be used as a source for political deliberation and guidance. Also, students might explore Nussbaum’s view on the fact that not all freedoms are equal: some are central, some are trivial, some are good, and some are bad. Responses might refer to Rawls’s view on justice and Sen’s critique of it or highlight the concept of equilibrium that leads to the idea of “overlapping consensus”: Nussbaum’s approach is a form of political liberalism. Finally, students might explore other views, e.g. Harsanyi’s form of welfarism, utilitarianism, contractarianism, Locke, Kant.

Part A: When explaining, students may refer to:

- Sen’s view on equality
- the relationship between equality and freedom
- the relationship between freedom and capabilities
- Nussbaum’s view on Rawls’ theory of justice
- Nussbaum’s view on political liberalism
- the concept of “overlapping consensus”.

Part B: When evaluating, students may refer to:

- whether equality calls for a limitation of freedom
- other views on equality, e.g. Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Bobbio
- other views on freedom, e.g. Locke, Mill, Constant, Berlin, Bobbio
- whether some capabilities are more important than others
- Sen’s critique of Rawls’s theory of justice
- Harsanyi’s form of welfarism
- other views on social justice, e.g. Locke, Rousseau
- the concept of human dignity, e.g. Kant.

José Ortega y Gasset: *The Revolt of the Masses*

17. (a) **Explain Ortega y Gasset’s claim that Europe is suffering from the greatest crisis that can afflict peoples, nations, and civilization.** [10]
- (b) **Evaluate Ortega y Gasset’s claim that Europe is suffering from the greatest crisis that can afflict peoples, nations, and civilization.** [15]

The question refers to Ortega y Gasset’s central concern in this work: the rebellion of the masses. He takes as his starting point the fact that the public life of Europe was determined by the accession of the masses to complete social power.

Given that the masses “neither should nor can direct their own personal existence, and still less rule society in general, this fact means that actually Europe is suffering from the greatest crisis that can afflict peoples, nations, and civilization” (p.11). On the one hand, this “formidable fact” (p.11) could be understood in an exclusively or primarily political sense, but, on the other hand, it has a wider and deeper meaning that includes, but goes beyond, the political dimension. Accordingly, Ortega argues that “Public life is not solely political, but equally, and even primarily, intellectual, moral, economic, religious; it comprises all our collective habits, including our fashions both of dress and of amusement” (p.11). This has given rise to two lines of interpretation or reading that either emphasize the political or sociological character of the concepts of “rebellion”, “masses” and “social power”, or explore their philosophical implications. Responses may combine the above, including referring to historical events.

Part A: When explaining, students may refer to:

- the accession of the masses to social power
- the masses and the shaping of public life
- the wide range of public life: from the political dimension to fashion
- the concept of mass-man: “The mass-man is he whose life lacks any purpose, and simply goes drifting along” (p.49)
- human life as finding oneself in circumstances or in the world around one
- historical events related to the rebellion of the masses, for example fascism, the Bolshevik revolution.

Part B: When evaluating, students may refer to:

- To what extent does Ortega present a pessimistic view of the rise of the masses, above all?
- relationships between the role of the masses in the public sphere and forms of government
- Are the masses really totally incapable of directing their own personal existence or the governance of society in general, as Ortega claims?
- political, sociological and philosophical views on the concepts of “rebellion”, “masses” and “social power”
- the extent to which the mass-man, although full of possibilities and power, constructs nothing
- the reverse side of the rebellion of the masses: the desertion of the ruling minorities
- the idea of rebellion of the masses in relation to central concepts in Ortega’s philosophy, for example “I am myself and my circumstances”, “historical reason”
- philosophical and other approaches to 20th century mass society, for example: the Frankfurt School, existentialism, M. Weber.

18. (a) Explain Ortega y Gasset’s idea of the “barbarism of specialization”. [10]
- (b) Evaluate Ortega y Gasset’s idea of the “barbarism of specialization”. [15]

The barbarism of specialization is inseparable from the idea of the rebellion of the masses. Ortega y Gasset’s analysis is based on his thesis that the civilization of the 19th century automatically produced the mass-man. This civilization “may be summed up in the two great dimensions: liberal democracy and technicism” (p.107). Focusing on the latter, he notes that “Modern technicism springs from the union between capitalism and experimental science” (p.107). For Ortega y Gasset, the prototype of the mass-man was to be found in the members of the liberal professions, who projected the competence of their speciality onto other fields in which they were ignorant. In this context, it turns out that “the actual scientific man is the prototype of the mass-man. Not by chance, not through the individual failings of each man of science, but because science itself—the root of our civilization—automatically converts him into mass-man, makes of him a primitive, a modern barbarian” (p.108). It is not the historical facts as such, but Ortega y Gasset’s interpretation and evaluation of them that have been challenged and contradicted, for example, by arguing that despite his specialization, scientific work is guided by a more holistic ideal of the function of knowledge in culture.

Part A: When explaining, students may refer to:

- the mass-man does not refer to a social class, but to a type of man that can be found in all social classes
- the mass-man as the dominant, ruling power, imposing the forms of his own mind
- the development of experimental science, which began towards the end of the 16th century (Galileo) and is constituted at the close of the end of the 17th century (Newton)
- the members of the liberal professions as a new aristocracy and the prototype of the mass-man
- in each generation, the scientist, having to reduce the scope of his work, gradually lost contact with other branches of science.

Part B: When evaluating, students may refer to:

- the connections between the historical facts (for example, development of experimental science) and their interpretation and evaluation
- cases from the history of the physical and biological sciences that illustrate the process of increasing specialization in the work of researchers
- the multiple functions of science and its impact on knowledge, society and culture
- the extent to which scientists can be seen as the prototype of the mass-man
- Ortega y Gasset’s dichotomous view of the select minority versus the masses and its relation to Nietzsche’s ideas
- Ortega y Gasset’s anti-progressivism, for him, progressivism is an ideology that acts as a refuge for the masses
- the extent to which scientific work necessarily requires specialization
- the association of the development of modern science with power and control over nature.

Plato: *The Republic*, Books IV–IX

19. (a) **Explain Plato’s theory of knowledge as an ascent from mere opinion to knowledge of the Forms.** [10]
- (b) **Evaluate Plato’s theory of knowledge as an ascent from mere opinion to knowledge of the Forms.** [15]

The Allegory of the Cave (pp.514a–517a) can plausibly be seen as reinforcing the Divided Line (pp.509d–511e) passage in depicting an epistemic ascent from mere opinion of sensible things to knowledge of intelligible realities, the Forms. It shows how ordinary human existence resembles the fate of prisoners shackled in a sunless cave, while the philosopher is like someone who has escaped from the cave up to the brightly lit surface. In this allegory, developing knowledge becomes the process of being liberated and brought to see first the fire, then the mouth of the cave, and at last the sunlit world outside. The epistemic ascent moves towards the eminently suitable objects of knowledge, the Forms, to finally attempt at seeing the source of all light, the Sun (pp.515c–516b). Understanding this process involves a variety of interpretative foci and arguments that may arise in the discussion, e.g. the possibility of knowledge of the sensible world and how forms apply to it. All this increases when more general lines of interpretation come into play, e.g. that the *Republic*’s epistemology is subordinate to its overriding ethical concerns. Students might also focus on the ethical and metaphysical dimensions of the theory of knowledge.

Part A: When explaining, students may refer to:

- the Divided Line (pp.509d–511e); the Allegory of the Cave (pp.514a–517a)
- the assumption of the allegory that for every kind of knowledge there is a separate thing that is known
- the theory of Forms as an attempt to provide humans with ultimate explanations by appealing to essences
- the Forms show the proper philosophical knowledge which involves the ability to give an account
- the Sun, as the source of all energy, makes possible the existence of every living thing; the Form of the Good, makes possible the knowledge of Forms and causes them (pp.509a–b).

Part B: When evaluating, students may refer to:

- characteristics of Forms in contrast to sensible things: uniqueness (pp.476a; 507b; 596b); intelligible and not visible (p.524c); made by a god (p.597b)
- the images of light as the centre of the *Republic*’s epistemology; ethical aim and ethical framework of Plato’s arguments on epistemology
- dialectic as movement and development of knowledge
- the possible role of ignorance in epistemology (Socrates)
- the extent to which Plato’s conception of knowledge is based on a dualism between the world of sensible objects and the true ideal world of Forms
- foundationalist character of Plato’s epistemology; discussion of skeptical arguments
- the legacy of Plato’s epistemology in contemporary debate: the question of *a priori* knowledge, the cognitive status of logic and mathematics; questions of innateness, e.g. in language acquisition
- possible connections with Plato’s political conception, for instance how the epistemic ascent seems to be reserved for philosopher kings, and not for *Hoi Polloi*.

20. (a) **Explain Plato’s claim that the philosopher king bases power and authority on the knowledge of the Form of the Good.** [10]
- (b) **Evaluate Plato’s claim that the philosopher king bases power and authority on the knowledge of the Form of the Good.** [15]

The question is framed by the central question of the *Republic*: what is justice? The Platonic idea of justice (just, justice, right -*dikaion*, *dikaiosunê*) applies both to the individual and to the city or state. In Socrates’s accounts of a just city-state and a just person (pp.432, 442), he sustains that “a just man won’t differ at all from a just city with respect to the form of justice but will be like it” (p.435b). At the core of Socrates’s arguments about justice is the philosopher-king, who combines political power and authority with philosophical knowledge of the transcendent, unchanging Form of the Good and of the ideal city he is to rule, Kallipolis, “the beautiful” or “noble city”. On the one hand, it has been suggested that the organic conception of the state represents a paternalistic or authoritarian view. On the other hand, however, Plato does not conceive of the state in such a way as to demand irrational loyalty from its citizens. On the contrary, loyalty to the state would ultimately be based on rational conviction.

Part A: When explaining, students may refer to:

- “in the beginning as a universal requirement when we were founding our city [...] is justice” (p.433a)
- “each man must perform the one social service in the state for which his nature was best adapted” (p.433a)
- justice in the soul (p.434d ss): the just soul is the soul of one who is most likely to perform just deeds
- the role of the philosopher-rulers (p.471c ss)
- knowledge as an essential dimension of political authority
- for the city, as for the individual, politics is not only about doing justice, but also about understanding it, because without understanding this practice will not last.

Part B: When evaluating, students may refer to:

- need for the state: man, taken individually, is not self-sufficient (p.369b)
- the main types of injustice (p.445c) and the forms of government: timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, tyranny
- Popper’s claim that Plato is the precursor of modern totalitarian states
- Plato was classed as authoritarian because he believed that moral propositions could be known as surely as those of mathematics
- Plato’s foundation of authority and political power and other arguments in the development of political thought to know, for example, social contract theories
- the extent to which the promotion of union, as justice does, can only be achieved by founding it in knowledge
- the Platonic conception of the state in comparison and contrast with other views, historical or theoretical
- education, the educational program and the metaphysical dimension of education.

Charles Taylor: *The Ethics of Authenticity*

21. (a) **Explain Taylor’s claim that the ideal of authenticity incorporates some views of society.** [10]
- (b) **Evaluate Taylor’s claim that the ideal of authenticity incorporates some views of society.** [15]

The question stems from Chapter 5 and invites an exploration of the ideal of authenticity, as Taylor defines it. Taylor holds that “individualism as a moral principle or ideal must offer some view on how the individual should live with others” (p.45). Students might consider the two meanings of individualism that Taylor illustrates in his text: individualism of anomie and individualism as a moral ideal. Students might mention some philosophical theories which, while focused on individualism, proposed models of society, e.g. contractarianism. Students might also explore Taylor’s view on soft relativism. Moreover, students might pinpoint the role that relationships and ties play in self-fulfillment and self-identity: the dialogical character of humans, the role of language, the concept of “horizons of significance” might all be explored. Students might also explore the role of relationships and social participation within the instrumental reason, with the consequence of soft despotism. Students might refer to Taylor’s view on the collapse of social hierarchies and their link to the concept of honour, as a cause for the change in the meaning of identity and authenticity in modern society. Responses might take into account the role that recognition, both at individual and social level, plays in shaping identity. Finally, students might refer to other views on social participation, e.g. Plato, Hobbes, Rousseau, Rawls, Nozick.

Part A: When explaining, students may refer to:

- two kinds of individualism
- roots of individualism as a moral ideal with views on society, e.g. Locke
- the concept of soft relativism
- the role of relationships in self-fulfillment and identity
- the concept of “horizons of significance”
- the concept of “honour”.

Part B: When evaluating, students may refer to:

- other views on individualism in relation with society, e.g. Plato, Hobbes, Rousseau, Rawls
- whether language helps to shape identity in social manners, e.g. Wittgenstein
- other views on the role of dialogue, e.g. Buber
- the role of love in relationships, e.g. Scheler, Ortega y Gasset
- whether technology makes self-fulfillment and the shaping of identity monological, e.g. Foucault
- soft despotism as linked to other concepts, such as “tyranny of majority” or “revolt of the masses”, e.g. de Tocqueville, Mill, Ortega y Gasset
- social and political participation linked to individualism of anomie, e.g. Nozick.

22. (a) Explain Taylor’s claim that we will need relationships to fulfil ourselves. [10]
- (b) Evaluate Taylor’s claim that we will need relationships to fulfil ourselves. [15]

The question stems from Chapter 4 and invites an exploration of a central topic in Taylor’s text: “the general feature of human life [...] is its fundamentally *dialogical* character” (pp.32–33). Students might explore the dialogical character in relation with the moral ideal of authenticity: “Reasoning in moral matters is always reasoning with somebody” (p.31). Responses might focus on the role that language plays in shaping individual identity and the broad sense that Taylor means for it: language as the diverse modes of expression. Whatever the kind of language, humans never acquire it on their own. Students might consider Taylor’s view on the fact the people tend to gain some control over the influence of other people and to establish a certain degree of independence, whereas the understanding of good things results in the will to share and enjoy them with the people we love. Hence, self-fulfillment actually calls for the others, who become internal to our identity. Students might refer to monological figures, such as the hermit or the solitary artist: in both these cases the dialogical character is present, since the hermit refers to God and the artists addresses their works. Students might pinpoint the fact that the dialogical character is related to human significance, which cannot be self-determined: responses might explore the meaning of the “significant others” and the view that “things take on importance against a background of intelligibility” (p.37), or “horizons”. Finally, students might consider other ethical views, e.g. subjectivism, situationism, relativism.

Part A: When explaining, students may refer to:

- dialogical versus monological character of human life
- the role that language plays in shaping identity
- the relationship between self-fulfillment and shaping of identity
- monological figures, e.g. the hermit and the solitary artist
- the concept of “significant others”
- the concept of “horizons”.

Part B: When evaluating, students may refer to:

- whether dialogue is a human feature; other views, e.g. Buber
- the relationship between dialogue and reciprocity, e.g. Ortega y Gasset
- whether dialogue and language are a feature that can be extended to non-human animals
- the role and nature of language, e.g. Ayer, Wittgenstein
- language and expression in different cultures, e.g. gestures, nonverbal communication
- other views on sharing good things and enjoying them with others, e.g. Aristotle’s virtue of liberality
- whether technology fosters the shaping of the self and a monological character, e.g. social media
- ethical views on subjectivism, relativism, intuitionism, e.g. Sidgwick, Scheler, Fletcher.

Lao Tzu: *Tao Te Ching*

23. (a) Explain the characteristics of the sage (*sheng ren*) in the *Tao Te Ching*. [10]

(b) Evaluate the characteristics of the sage (*sheng ren*) in the *Tao Te Ching*. [15]

The sage is given the primary task of living the exemplary life in order to encourage and signpost others in their relationship with the Tao. The ideal person is the *sheng ren*—or “man of calling” and as sages they practise non-action/*wu-wei* in a way that aligns with the Tao, and thus they exemplify the effortless action, which is really what “non-action” means. The link with non-action/*wu wei* can be seen in Chapters 2 and 63. The embodiment of both *yin* and *yang* can be seen in Chapters 28 and 42, and their likeness to uncarved wood (Chapter 19) helps assert their plainness and lack of artifice. They are soft and yielding as water (Chapter 8) and the sage embodies humility like streams flowing to the sea in Chapter 66. The sage understands and exemplifies the importance of “emptying” and emptiness, such that metaphors like a canyon, valley, window, bowl and door are mentioned. The notion of the sage might be criticized for its almost mystical footing, and that there are paradoxes and practical questions in the concept of a sage such as this leading in government.

Part A: When explaining, students may refer to:

- the role ascribed as to the sage (*sheng ren*) as an exemplifier of the life lived in alignment with the Tao
- the sage as a possible ruler and the sage is a model human
- the sage’s embodiment of non-action/*wu wei*
- the sage’s contrast with the worldly pursuits of desire, action and materialism
- the metaphor with water
- the alignment with pure nature and the metaphors used to describe the virtues of the sage.

Part B: When evaluating, students may refer to:

- Is the non-worldly sage an effective exemplar for people in the world?
- Is the separation from political rule believable, given the concept of non-action/*wu wei* as the way to be in the world aligned with the Tao?
- How can such a distinct, unworldly individual with no apparent social needs, be an effective exemplar to promote social harmony and cooperation between people?
- Is it realistic to live as a *sheng ren* in the world we inhabit?
- Is this mysticism with little justification or verification?
- Is the sage’s aloofness a barrier to directing people to the Tao?

24. (a) Explain what Lao Tzu says about the art of government. [10]
- (b) Evaluate what Lao Tzu says about the art of government. [15]

To govern according to the principles of the Tao is to rule according to the values of harmony, non-action and humility. In Chapter 17 the ruler is described as being most effective when the people are not actually aware of him or his existence. The people will then be empowered to think they had achieved the life in the state themselves and not because of the ruler. This is given an extended metaphor with the phrase, “governing a great state is like cooking small fish”, where too much poking spoils the dish. Rather, a great state is better as a low-lying, down-flowing stream, with this picture of passive fitting in with nature and minimizing interventions. In Chapter 61, a comparison is made with the female “who overcomes the male by the power of her position. Her tranquility gives rise to her humility” the emphasis is on simplicity and not the multiplication of enactments or possessions which encourage disorder. In Chapter 57 the notion of unnecessary intervention is called “contrivance” and the more legislation there is, the more criminals will appear. There is, therefore, encouragement to emptiness in government (Chapter 22) and moderation (Chapter 59). Is this a reasonable expectation of government—that it can be encouraged through a philosophical outlook as opposed to a practical one? Critics might counter with questions about the relationship between the small state being “underneath” the great state.

Part A: When explaining, students may refer to:

- the application of non-action/*wu wei* to the art of government
- ruling with non-action/*wu wei* helps oppositions disappear
- the role of the sage in ensuring the application of the philosophical outlook inspired by the Tao (as opposed to any regulations, rules or guidelines)
- the female imagery of ruling the state
- the ruler’s application of the past to the present and future
- the advancement of a minimalist conception of government.

Part B: When evaluating, students may refer to:

- The description of government lacks rules and guidelines and is more a philosophical outlook—is this practical or able to be used effectively?
 - In Chapter 3 the sage fills the bellies but empties the minds of the people—is this an acceptable vision of the art of government?
 - see modern versions of minimalist government intervention—a battle between individualist and communitarian conceptions of political values
 - Can non-action/*wu wei* guarantee fairness and equity? Are these desirable?
 - Is the conception of the art of government unrealistic and unapplicable in the real world?
 - Mill, Plato, Machiavelli and different perspectives on government.
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